The Union Government’s recent decision to enhance reservation for ex-Agniveers to 50% of constable and Group-C posts in the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) marks a sharp and unsettling departure from its earlier policy. While the stated objective is to provide post-service rehabilitation to Agniveers, the implications of this move—particularly for the Border Security Force—raise serious concerns about force cohesion, operational efficiency, and long-term manpower planning.

Instead of addressing existing structural challenges, the policy risks reviving old fault lines and introducing new ones, potentially weakening forces that form the backbone of India’s internal and border security architecture.

CAPFs Are Not the Army: Integration vs Regimentation

The Indian Army follows a regimental system where units are historically organized along regional or ethnic lines—Rajput, Kumaon, Maratha, and Gorkha regiments being classic examples. This system thrives on homogeneity and deep-rooted regimental identity.

CAPFs, and especially the BSF, function on a completely different model. A BSF battalion represents pan-Indian integration, drawing personnel from all states, religions, and social backgrounds. Unit cohesion here is built on uniform service conditions, identical career progression pathways, and common training standards.

Introducing a large, preferentially absorbed cohort of ex-Agniveers risks creating distinct classes within the force, a concept alien to CAPF ethos. Such stratification can erode morale, weaken discipline, and undermine the very cohesion required for sustained deployment in hostile and isolated border areas.

A Hard Lesson from the Past: Officer Cadre Fragmentation

The BSF’s own institutional history offers a cautionary tale. In the past, the officer cadre was fragmented among promotee officers from the rank, Emergency Commissioned Officers, Short Service Commission officers, and Direct Entry officers. The consequences were predictable and painful—prolonged litigation over seniority, stagnation in promotions, and deep-seated dissatisfaction within the ranks.

That experience should have served as a permanent warning. By reserving half of the constable intake for ex-Agniveers, the government risks recreating similar divisions at the operational level, where unity and motivation are non-negotiable for effectiveness.

At present, under the BSF’s basic training system, newly recruited personnel are given detailed training in border management, crowd control, flag meetings, border-related crimes, procedures of arrest, and search and seizure under the BNSS and the Customs Act. In contrast, Agniveers have been exempted from undergoing such comprehensive basic training. This is likely to create a significant gap in operational efficiency and overall effectiveness.

Shrinking Opportunities for the 21–25 Age Group

There is also a fundamental demographic imbalance in the policy design. Agniveers are inducted at around 17–21 years of age, whereas eligibility for BSF constable recruitment traditionally lies between 21 and 25 years. This age group includes candidates who may have pursued higher education, technical skills, or competitive preparation.

A 50% reservation drastically reduces opportunities for this segment, effectively penalizing maturity, education, and preparedness. Over time, this will narrow the talent pool available to CAPFs and discourage aspirants who once saw these forces as a stable and respectable long-term career.

A Drastic and Premature Escalation of Reservation

The abrupt jump in reservation from 10% to 50% is not merely excessive—it is premature and poorly calibrated. In all likelihood, a substantial number of these reserved posts may remain vacant. After completing four years of service, many Agniveers—benefiting from a financial package and youthful flexibility—are expected to try their luck in business, private security, or state police forces, which offer better stability, urban postings, and comparatively attractive service conditions.

For many, the BSF will remain the last preference, owing to its harsh terrain, isolated border postings, frequent transfers, and prolonged separation from family. Instead of hastily multiplying the quota fivefold, the government should have waited for a few years, assessed actual absorption trends, preferences of discharged Agniveers, and vacancy outcomes, and then taken an evidence-based decision. Policy made in haste risks disrupting manpower planning in a force already stretched thin.

A Sudden Policy U-Turn Without Ground Assessment The government’s earlier assurance spoke of limited preference for ex-Agniveers. The present decision to reserve 50% of posts—initially in the BSF and now extending to Group-C posts across other CAPFs—represents a fundamental policy reversal.

Such a sweeping change, implemented without transparent consultation or published impact assessment, risks treating CAPFs as a convenient absorption mechanism rather than as specialized forces with distinct operational mandates.

CAPFs Are Not a Dumping Ground

There is growing unease among serving personnel that CAPFs are being viewed as a repository for short-tenure manpower, including those who could not be retained elsewhere. Ex-Agniveers exiting after four years may carry frustration, uncertainty, and unmet expectations, which—if injected en masse—can negatively affect morale and discipline in high-stress operational environments. Security forces cannot be managed like employment schemes. They demand continuity, predictability, and institutional loyalty. 

( The writer is a 1984-batch BSF officer and former DIG, BPR&D. Views are personal. )