What the smartphone did to the crowd — and what a government can still do about it
O. P. Singh
- Posted: July 27, 2026
- Updated: 02:32 PM
The iconography of protest used to be a closed hand. For a century the raised fist did the work — a body’s whole weight thrown up at whoever watched from the balcony. The silhouette has changed: the arm still goes up, but it ends in a rectangle of glass, held level, tilted down toward the cordon. The fist was a threat. The phone is a witness. Only one of them has brought down governments somewhere in a week.
My own education began where there was no glass at all. In Kandela, a village in Haryana’s Jind district, farmers felled a tree across the highway over unpaid electricity bills, and the state read a political argument as a traffic problem and sent the police. I was at that roadblock. Nobody died, and we read the absence of bodies as proof of success. Nothing had been settled. The agitation ran on, and in May 2002, at Gulkani in the same district, police firing killed nine farmers.
What I take from it is not the violence but the calendar. That quarrel had weeks to go wrong, and it moved at the speed of a bus and a rumour carried to a tehsil meeting. There was always a name — a sarpanch, a union man, someone the administration could summon or detain. The arrangement is older than policing: at Troy the elders talk on the wall while the young men go down to the plain. The young man’s job is to supply the body.
Two things then arrived together and dissolved all of it. The instrument: a device that lets a nineteen-year-old broadcast, verify and mobilise without anyone’s permission. And the number: some 1.8 billion people aged ten to twenty-four, the largest youth generation on record. That crowd does not need the wall. It argues in group chats no elder is in and settles where to stand tomorrow in a process that leaves no minutes. Seniority is no longer a licence to lead; it is a fact about a person’s age.
For an officer the loss is precise. The old craft was anticipation — read the intelligence, guess the route, know the names, work the telephone all night. Now there is no headquarters to raid and no emissary to settle with. The crowd is not leaderless so much as leader-full: a thousand nodes, any of which can be arrested without the movement slowing. Twenty-two seconds of footage can fill a square by sundown. A state that moves at the pace of a file must answer at the pace of a share.
The record is not ambiguous. In Colombo, a crowd walked into the President’s House on 9 July 2022; Gotabaya Rajapaksa fled on the 13th and resigned on the 14th. In Dhaka, a quota protest that began in early July 2024 ended a fifteen-year government by 5 August, at a cost the United Nations puts near 1,400 lives. In Kathmandu, a ban on twenty-six social media platforms on 4 September 2025 brought down the ban’s own authors in five days, killing seventy-six people on the way. India has seen the same young, camera-carrying crowds; the pattern is what matters, not any single gathering.
Almost everywhere the state reached for the inherited reflex: clear the ground, cut the network, make an example. That reflex is now the fastest way to lose. Every baton charge is filmed in portrait mode by nine people and is in the world before the man swinging it has caught his breath. Repression does not fracture a connected crowd; it fuses one. Disperse a thousand on Tuesday and meet ten thousand on Wednesday — and the ten thousand include their parents.
The young should not romanticise this either. Colombo’s crowd had four patient months behind that one afternoon, and what it won was a resignation, not a working state. A camera is a superb instrument of veto and a clumsy one of construction.
So, the repair — and almost none of it happens on the day. By the time a square is full, a government is spending a balance it built, or failed to build, a year earlier.
In Gurugram, from November 2013, we closed busy roads to traffic on Sunday mornings — the idea lifted from Bogotá’s Ciclovía — and handed them to whoever turned up, to cycle, to run, to play badminton down the middle of a carriageway. The instruction to officers was the whole of the policy: come in a tracksuit and join in; do not stand behind a barricade watching. The format has since spread past fifty Indian cities. After the Jat agitation of February 2016 left at least thirty dead, we did not reach for a curfew, which stops violence and cures nothing. We organised mass runs, and men who had thrown stones at each other weeks earlier kept the same cadence toward the same finish line.
This is not sentiment. It is the stocking of an asset that can only be spent later. A constable who fixed a child’s bicycle chain on Sunday is a different man on Monday, and the crowd knows it — the plain sense of the line usually handed to Robert Peel, that the police are the public and the public are the police. Peel never wrote it; a historian distilled it from the first Metropolitan instructions a century later. It survives because officers can feel it is true.
When the day does come, three things decide it, in this order. Speed of truth: put out a credible official account before the rumour sets, because the vacuum fills in minutes. Differentiation: separate the twenty who came to fight from the two thousand who came to be heard, and refuse to treat them as one body — that single error manufactures a mob. Judgement at the front: send officers picked to talk and to absorb insult rather than answer it, because the day turns on which of them appears in the nine videos being shot over his shoulder.
Fear rents order by the hour, and the rate has just gone up sharply. Legitimacy owns it outright. When the crowd holds the camera, it is the state that is watched — and a watched state must earn what it once enforced. Build the door in the calm, or watch them come through the wall. / DAILY WORLD /
( The writer, a retired IPS officer, was Director General of Police, Haryana. His forthcoming book The Fear Tax: Decision Velocity for Viksit Bharat examines administrative inaction.)