Trump’s China visit: The emerging multipolar order and India
Nehaluddin Ahmad
- Posted: May 15, 2026
- Updated: 02:35 pm
The state visit of United States President Donald Trump to China from 13–15 May 2026 may eventually be remembered as one of the most consequential geopolitical engagements of the decade. This summit between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping is far more than a ceremonial diplomatic event or a symbolic display of statesmanship. It reflects a deeper strategic attempt by the world’s two largest powers to recalibrate relations amidst intensifying geopolitical fragmentation, technological rivalry, energy insecurity, and the ongoing crisis surrounding Iran and the Middle East.
The language emerging from Beijing is itself revealing. President Xi’s emphasis on “constructive strategic stability” and his repeated assertion that “China and the United States should be partners, not rivals” indicate a recognition that confrontation between the two powers could destabilize the global system itself. At the same time, President Trump’s unusually warm praise for Xi Jinping reflects a pragmatic and transactional approach rooted less in ideology and more in strategic calculation. Both leaders appear to understand that competition may continue, but collision must be avoided.
This summit is taking place at a moment when the global balance of power is visibly shifting. The post-Cold War unipolar order dominated by the United States is increasingly being challenged by China’s rise as an economic, technological, and geopolitical power. Yet despite years of trade wars, sanctions, tariffs, and military tensions, the United States and China remain deeply interconnected economically. American markets continue to depend heavily on Chinese manufacturing and supply chains, while China remains dependent on access to global markets, advanced technologies, and stable energy flows.
The composition of Trump’s delegation itself reveals the true nature of the visit. The inclusion of leading American corporate executives from Apple, Boeing, BlackRock, Goldman Sachs, Mastercard, and other multinational firms demonstrates that business diplomacy and economic stabilization remain central concerns. The United States is aware that complete economic decoupling from China is neither practical nor economically sustainable. Chinese products continue to dominate major segments of American consumer markets, ranging from electronics and machinery to batteries and solar technologies. For Washington, the summit appears to pursue three broad strategic objectives. First, the United States seeks trade stabilization. Years of tariff wars and economic confrontation have disrupted global supply chains and increased inflationary pressures. Second, the United States wants crisis management regarding Taiwan. Washington does not want a simultaneous escalation in both the Middle East and the Taiwan Strait. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the United States seeks Chinese cooperation in managing instability in the Gulf region and the Iran conflict.
The Iran factor has become central to contemporary geopolitics. Iran today is not merely a regional actor, but an energy chokepoint power situated near the Strait of Hormuz, through which a substantial portion of global oil supplies passes. China is one of the largest buyers of Iranian oil, while the United States continues to maintain the broader Gulf security architecture. If the Iran conflict escalates further, oil prices could skyrocket, inflation could intensify globally, and both the American and Chinese economies would face severe disruptions. Thus, both powers increasingly appear interested in “managed rivalry” rather than uncontrolled escalation.
China’s strategic objectives are equally clear. Beijing seeks stable access to Gulf energy routes, reduced American pressure in the South China Sea, greater restraint by Washington on the Taiwan issue, and relaxation of technology restrictions involving semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and advanced computing systems. Over the past several years, the United States has imposed sweeping restrictions on Chinese technology firms such as Huawei and tightened export controls on advanced chips and AI technologies. China perceives these measures as attempts to contain its technological rise. Another critical dimension of this summit concerns the future of the international financial system. China has increasingly sought to reduce dependence on the US dollar by promoting Yuan-based trade, digital currency systems, and alternative financial mechanisms through the expanded BRICS grouping. China, Russia, Iran, and several Gulf actors have increasingly explored non-dollar trade arrangements. This trend has generated concern in Washington because the dollar-based global financial system remains one of America’s most powerful geopolitical tools. Through sanctions, banking restrictions, and SWIFT controls, the United States exercises enormous influence over the international economic order.
Yet BRICS itself is not a unified anti-Western bloc. India’s role within BRICS remains particularly significant and complex. India continues to pursue a strategy of strategic autonomy rather than alignment with either Washington or Beijing. While India participates actively in BRICS and supports aspects of multipolarity, it remains cautious about any financial system dominated by China or the Yuan. New Delhi does not wish to replace American financial dominance with Chinese financial dominance. India’s concerns are shaped by continuing border tensions with China, competition in the Indian Ocean, and strategic mistrust following incidents such as Galwan.
For India, the implications of the Trump–Xi summit are profound. On one hand, any stabilization between the United States and China could reduce immediate regional tensions and support global economic recovery. On the other hand, India must carefully navigate an increasingly complex geopolitical environment in which both Washington and Beijing seek influence across Asia, the Indo-Pacific, and the Global South. India’s likely response will involve strengthening its own strategic balancing role. New Delhi will continue deepening relations with the United States, Japan, Europe, and Gulf states while simultaneously preserving engagement within BRICS and maintaining relations with Russia. India increasingly sees itself as a “bridge power” capable of balancing between competing geopolitical blocs. Its long-term strategy will likely focus on manufacturing expansion, technological development, infrastructure modernization, supply-chain diversification, and enhanced maritime partnerships through initiatives such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
The broader significance of President Donald Trump’s visit to China lies in its reflection of a changing global order increasingly shaped not only by military power, but also by energy routes, semiconductor supply chains, artificial intelligence, digital currencies, maritime corridors, and technological sovereignty. The Trump–Xi summit signals an attempt to manage strategic rivalry while avoiding confrontation. The world is gradually moving toward a fragmented yet interconnected multipolar order where competition and cooperation coexist simultaneously. For India and the wider international community, the major challenge will be maintaining strategic balance and stability amidst intensifying geopolitical competition. In that sense, this summit may be the beginning of a new phase of carefully managed global competition, not rivalry. / DAILY WORLD /
( Prof Nehaluddin Ahmad, LL.D. Professor of Law, Sultan Sharif Ali Islamic University (UNISSA), Brunei, Email: ahmadnehal@yahoo.com.)