Theocracy, as a form of governance, represents a fusion of religious authority and political power. The legitimacy of theocracies is derived, not from popular sovereignty or institutional rationality, but from divine sanction, interpreted through clerical elites and religious doctrine. In spite of their claim of deriving power from an eternal and unquestionable sacred authority, history demonstrates that they are neither immune to internal decay nor resistant to external pressures.

Theocracies can last for surprisingly long periods in spite of the inherent contradictions and misuse of the putative divine authority. Papal political authority was manifested as direct foreign rule over the European Catholic states; it lasted for more than a millennium, 1,114 years to be exact, from the 8th century to the 19th with real secular control over European kings lasting from the 11th to the 16th century. The Ottoman Caliphate lasted for more than six centuries from the 13th till the 20th! When it was under attack from the West, surprisingly, even the likes of Gandhi exhorted Indians to support it; he tied up this cause with the obviously secular non-cooperation movement.

The fall of theocracies is rarely sudden; rather, it is the outcome of cumulative tensions between ideology, governance, economy, geopolitical environment and societal change. At the core of theocracies lies a fundamental paradox: the attempt to impose static divine laws on dynamic, evolving societies. Religious doctrine, particularly when codified into law, tends to resist reinterpretation, whereas societies continuously transform due to technological progress, demographic shifts, and global interactions.

The theocratic inflexibility and society’s flux create a widening gap between state ideology and lived reality. Over time, citizens—especially younger and more urban populations—begin to perceive the system as anachronistic or oppressive. This dissonance often manifests in cultural resistance, intellectual dissent, and eventually, political opposition. The dissonance is amplified when governance failure becomes too stark to be ignored; the masses raise the obvious question – if this governance is by divine will, is God failing or is the claim false? Theocracies do not have the luxury of blaming failure on geopolitical, economic or technical factors, a comfort available to secular regimes.

In spite of the claim of monotheism in major religions, over time, all religions develop factions. The Shia-Sunni schism in the very early years of Islam has lasted the entire existence of that religion, with civil-strife-like attacks on religious processions and shrines as well as large-scale wars being regular features in the Islamic world. The 8-year long Iraq-Iran War, the actions of Iran’s proxies in West Asia, the civil war in Syria and the rise of the Islamic State were all grounded in the Shia-Sunni conflict, though sometimes triggered by external factors. The rise of Protestantism resulted in similar hate-filled intra-Christian conflicts in the West, starting with the Thirty Years’ War in the 17th century and culminating in the UK-Irish conflict, including what is called “the Troubles” lasting 30 years - from 1968 to 1998.

Such struggles always result in the hardening of theocratic regimes, increased resistance from the masses and even fragmentation of the ruling structure. For some time, even India witnessed conflict between followers of Shiva and those of Vishnu but it appears that Indians were more sagacious; they synthesised the two, making each a devotee of the other and merging even the images as HariHara, a compound word of the names of both Vishnu and Shiva. Similarly, the Hindu Buddhist conflict seems to have been quenched in its early stages by incorporating Buddha as the ninth incarnation of Vishnu and installing his images in the Navagrah panels in Hindu temples.

Very few religions in the world promote open societies that encourage questioning of every doctrine and questioning the doctrinal answers. It is no wonder that theocracies fossilise into rigid systems where every dot and comma becomes sacrosanct; there is no room for modifying and bringing it in line with changing times. With the passage of time, such belief systems become more and more anachronistic and detached from reality and the enforcement of such tenets on the new generation results in conflict.

All theocracies go through this process of cumulative delegitimation. The regime can no longer convincingly claim to represent the divine will, deliver material well-being, maintain internal cohesion, or control the flow of ideas. Its foundations begin to crumble. The sacred aura that once shielded it from criticism becomes a liability, as failures are interpreted not merely as political shortcomings but as moral and spiritual betrayals. This transformation—from unquestioned authority to contested legitimacy—is the decisive turning point in the life cycle of theocratic systems.

The psyche of the present regime in Iran as well of the young protestors seeking to overthrow that regime has to be seen in this context. The 1979 Islamic Revolution replaced the Pahlavi monarchy with a novel theocratic model built around velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) and institutionalised it by incorporating it into the new constitution. It created the position of Supreme Leader with sweeping authority over the armed forces, judiciary, state media, and key vetting institutions such as the Guardian Council, creating clerical oversight over the presidency and the parliament and even the elections to these institutions. The devastating Iran-Iraq War, instead of showing the follies of theocratic rule, gave a mantle to the clerics of being the defenders of the nations.

The cumulative delegitimation of the regime has led to waves of protest, not only against specific issues but also against the regime in general. The 1999 student protest, the 2009 Green Movement and the 2017-2019 protest brought into open the dissatisfaction with the theocracy. When a young woman Mahsa Amini was killed by the moral-police in 2022, protests erupted in the whole country, loud and clear against the theocracy but also, for the first time, against the Supreme Leader Khamenei. These protests, called the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, have not died out since then, in spite of brutal oppression by the regime. The protests gained new traction as the economy collapsed, the value of the currency nose-dived reaching absurd levels of 1.40 million rial to a dollar and water scarcity became ever more acute.

The brutal response of the regime resulted in the deaths of more than 35,000 civilians in just two days; the US and Israel attacks on Iran have reportedly killed 15,000 Iranians, a majority of them members of the security forces, over a period of 80 days. No wonder, some Iranians told a BBC reporter that they want the attacks on Iran to continue; accepting some civilian deaths as collateral damage in the war against the theocracy. The society is feeling suffocated with the internet blocked since February 28 and the IRGC and the Basij given a free hand to arrest anyone with an accusation of colluding with the enemy.

How will this regime fall? The unarmed Iranians are no match for a million-armed-men available to the regime, including the reserves. The IRGC is politically and economically all-powerful and it snubbed even the President over his reconciliatory statement. The IRGC has the most to lose if this regime falls. The regime is a theocracy in name only now; for all practical purposes, it is a military dictatorship. It has to be weakened before any talk of regime change will have meaning. Democracies owe the destruction of this regime to the Iranians and to their own democratic ideals, if they do not want to be judged by history as sham democracies who failed in their humanitarian duty of helping more than 90 million Iranians, caught in the jaws of this brutal regime. / DAILY WORLD /

( R N prasher is a former IAS officer. The views expressed are his personal.)