Iran and Afghanistan, in spite of their overlapping histories, are today countries as diverse as can be. For starters, Iran is Shia dominated, the leader of the Shia world and a theocracy where the Supreme Leader is, since the Islamic revolution in 1979, a Shia cleric. Afghanistan is, since the withdrawal of the US in 2021, formally a Sunni Emirate. It is ruled by the Taliban, a group of militants that had taken over after defeating the Soviet Union. They were, in turn, defeated by the US after 9/11 but were able to come back in 2021. The distance between the Shia and the Sunni can be judged by their wars; Iraq led by Sunni Saddam Hussein had fought a ten-year war with Shia Iran in which a million people had died. The Yemen conflict too is a Shia-Sunni conflict, with the former supported by Iran and the latter by the Saudis.

Iran is an ancient civilization and the cradle of Zoroastrianism that, in its heyday, covered the vast Persian Empire. Iran and Afghanistan overlapped during that period and Herat, one of the capitals of the Persian Empire, is located in today’s Afghanistan. Subsequent to the Islamic invasion, both were converted to Sunni Islam. In the 16th century, Iran was, however, converted by brute force to the Shia sect, with people forced to choose between three options - convert, leave or get killed. The atrocities are frozen in the Iranian psyche, making them the most religiously tolerant in the Muslim world. In fact, it was the religious tolerance of the Shah of Iran and his “White Revolution” which gave women the right to vote and legal equality in marriage that made the mullahs his enemy.

Even after more than four decades of theocratic rule, Iranians have not committed any acts of vandalism on minorities’ religious places and Hindu, Sikh, Christian and Zoroastrian shrines have remained safe. The Hindu temples in Bandar Abbas and Zahedan and the gurudwaras in Mashda, Zahedan and Bushehr have continued to function unmolested. This is in contrast to what has been happening to Hindus and their temples in Bangladesh and the vandalism by the Taliban of the ancient Buddhist images at Bamiyan. In spite of the considerable overlap between the cultures of Afghans and Iranians, the two have moved in different directions in recent decades. It is in this context that the protests, first against the hijab and now against theocracy itself have to be seen, in contrast with the silent acquiescence to the Mullahs’ diktats by the Afghans.

In spite of the upheavals in both these countries, India has maintained positive contacts with successive regimes in Kabul and Tehran. Immediately after partition, India supported the demand for Pashtunistan and hosted the Pashtun leader Abdul Gaffar Khan, calling him Frontier Gandhi. India established diplomatic relations with Afghanistan in 1950 and signed a Treaty of Friendship. When the Soviets occupied Afghanistan, India was the first South Asian country to recognise the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Even though India supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban’s first regime, we were able to work with the Taliban for the safe return of hostages when Air India flight 814 was hijacked toKandahar.

After the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, India became the largest aid provider to the US-supported Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. India helped Afghanistan in joining SAARC in 2007. India helped in building air links, roads, power plants, health and educational facilities and in the training of civil servants, diplomats and police. A car bomb at the Indian Embassy in Kabul killed 58 people including an Indian Army Brigadier. The Afghan government condemned the attack and called India a “brother country”. In spite of another car bomb attack on the Indian embassy in 2009, India continued to increase aid. In 2011, PM Manmohan Singh visited Kabul. Subsequently, President Karzai visited India and a strategic pact was signed that included training of security personnel. Karzai called India “a great friend” and Pakistan “a twin brother” with whom Afghanistan’s engagement “has not yielded the results” that Afghanistan wanted.

In 2015, India gifted 3 Mi-25 attack helicopters to Afghanistan. PM Modi visited Kabul to open the Parliament building constructed by India, calling it “an enduring symbol of the ties of emotions and values, of affection and aspiration that bind us in a special relationship.” Subsequently, PM Modi inaugurated the Salma Dam built by India with $290 million for generating power and providing irrigation. By the time the US withdrew in 2021 and the Taliban II regime took over, Indian investment in Afghanistan exceeded $3 billion. India had evacuated the Kabul embassy in 2021 but started it again in 2022, though we have not yet recognised the regime. We resumed humanitarian aid, particularly supply of wheat, in December 2021. Indian Foreign Secretary Misri met Afghan FM Muttaqi in Dubai in January 2025 and promised more Indian development assistance. In October, Muttaqi visited India and the Indian FM called Pakistan a “shared threat.” Muttaqi invited India to invest in minerals, agriculture and sports. Since then, there is close cooperation between the two countries, even without formal recognition.

India has maintained good working relations with all the regimes in Iran. With the last Shah of Iran, India had warm relations focussed on oil and cultural ties. India was non-aligned and the Shah was aligned with the West. Yet, we had several trade agreements with Iran before the ouster of the Shah in 1979. Post 1979 too, India maintained good strategic relations; Khomeini’s grandfather was from India (Kintoo village, Barabanki District, UP) and that created a bond too amid differences, as Iran became a theocratic state. There were differences over India’s ties with Israel but these did not stop trade and cultural ties. With Khamenei, relations became somewhat tense because of his utterances on Kashmir but trade and cultural engagement continued. In 2024, India signed a 10-year contract to operate the Shahid Beheshti Terminal of Chabahar port. If there is a regime change in Iran as a result of the current agitation, the new regime is likely to have even closer relations with India.

India’s foreign policy towards these two countries is driven by two goals; ‘managing’ Pakistan and developing connectivity to Central Asia and Europe. We have used the Shia-Sunni divide between Iran and Pakistan to get a foothold at Chabahar port that helps us bypass Pakistan for going to Kabul. Iran has a role to play in not reacting adversely to the activities of the Balochistan Liberation Front and the militants can escape to Iran’s Province of Baluchistan when chased by the Pakistan army. Similarly, immediately after Muttaqi’s visit to India, the Tehrik-e-Taliban activities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan have increased. The hostility of Afghanistan with Pakistan on the Pashtun issue has the effect of squeezing Pakistan both from the east and the west, disastrous for Pakistan at a time when Balochistan too is facing insurgency.

There is another positive outcome for India in the engagement with the Taliban. Till 2023, Afghan Mujahideen had regularly accompanied the Pakistanis for terror activities in Kashmir. In that year, the US weapons left at Bagram airbase were found with the terrorist killed in Kashmir. After our outreach to the Taliban regime, no Afghans or left-over US weapons have been seen in Kashmir. Simultaneously, anti-Pakistan demonstrations have become more frequent in Gilgit-Baltistan. If and when India is able to liberate POK, access to the narrow strip of Wakhan Corridor in Afghanistan from Gilgit Baltistan will be needed for connectivity with Tajikistan, the rest of Central Asia and Europe. Thus, our outreach to both Iran and Afghanistan, irrespective of the regime in control, is duly serving our interests in trade, in ‘managing’ Pakistan and in working for land connectivity  towards the north.

( R N prasher is a former IAS officer. The views expressed are his personal. )