China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the world’s largest in terms of sheer numbers; it has over two million soldiers, half of whom are in the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) and the rest are in the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). Although there is provision for mandatory military service, it has not been enforced because there have been enough volunteers attracted by perks and prestige. All male citizens, however, have to register when they reach 18 years of age; they can be called for active duty , if necessary, but it has not been done so far. Earlier, the soldiers came mainly from rural areas where the economic conditions have always been inferior to urban areas. In recent times, the PLA has prioritised recruiting graduates and those with high-tech qualifications due to change in war machines and methods. The technically proficient urban male from the one-child era, however, is not very keen on joining the military in spite of the perks and prestige that it offers.

China’s one-child policy, rigorously enforced from 1980 till 2015, has created several dimensions of demographic crisis. Because of a preference for sons, female foetuses were regularly aborted and abortions were officially encouraged and supported to help in implementing the one-child policy. This resulted in the male-to-female ratio rising from 1060 males per 1000 females in 1979 to 1170 in 2001 and about 40 million “missing women.” This squeeze, combined with tradition, which expects women to be housewives, has resulted in women making up less than 4 percent of the PLA; for comparison the US military figure is 17.2 percent.

Soldiers are typically recruited when they are around 20 years of age, which means that all soldiers recruited since 2000 are from one-child cohorts. Thus, virtually all the current two million soldiers of the various arms of the PLA are from that group. Chinese society places a very high value on filial duties towards the living as well as dead ancestors, including the annual tomb-sweeping ritual. Due to the one-child policy and increasing life expectancy which stands at 80 with higher figures for urban areas, every such soldier has two parents, four grandparents and may have up to eight great grandparents to look after during their lifetimes, to perform rituals when they die and also perform annual post-death rituals for all of them throughout his life.

While this responsibility results in strain on the soldier’s time and financial resources, even a greater source of worry for both the ancestors and the young man is the possibility of his death in any hostilities. The loss of a young soldier of the family in war is lamented everywhere and yet, simultaneously, there is also a pride in martyrdom. The Chinese situation leaves no room for such pride; the death of the one-child soldier being an unmitigated disaster for a large number of older individuals dependent on him for financial and ritualistic support. Sadly, even after the restrictions were abolished a decade ago, the fertility rates have not only remained low, but have actually declined even below the figure of 1.5 in the one-child era to less than 1.0 in 2025.

Thus, China’s one-child policy and the resultant permanent drop in the desire to have children have created a demographic and socio-cultural environment that structurally undermines the long-term recruitment base, resilience and combat effectiveness of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), even as Beijing pursues rapid military modernisation. Its cumulative impact is visible in shrinking cohorts of draft-age youth and a generation that many Chinese analysts themselves describe as less suited to the rigours of high-intensity warfare. It is not surprising that parents who complied with the draconian one-child policy are now reluctant to see their only child exposed to the dangers of the frontline.

It may be argued that future wars will be mostly fought with machines and fewer soldiers will be required. Studies have shown that while a lesser number of soldiers will be required on the battle front, the overall need for soldiers will actually increase due to the requirements of operating, controlling and maintaining the war machines. Moreover, China’s aggressive geopolitics will always mean physical occupation of contested territories and that will invariably require boots on the ground.

Beyond numbers, the one-child policy has generated a qualitative challenge in the human capital feeding the PLA. Research and PLA-linked commentary describe a “little emperor” generation of only children who grew up as the centre of attention for multiple adults, often enjoying greater material comfort and less hardship than earlier generations. Studies cited in defence analyses suggest that post-policy single children tend to be less altruistic and trusting, more timid, less competitive and less conscientious compared to peers born just before the policy.

Already there are complaints from field commanders that these “little emperor” soldiers from one-child families are less robust physically, averse to discipline and more prone to buckling under stress. They lack focus during training and are likely to listen to music on earphones during combat drills. They are more likely to feign illness and also have real stress-related health issues. They are more likely to be overweight, have eyesight degradation at an early age due to long hours on digital screens and are averse to self-dependence in simple tasks like laundry.

The casualty-averse behaviour inculcated into a single child will have serious implications for how China would weigh escalation, duration and intensity of potential conflicts. A force built around single-child soldiers drawn from families with limited ability to absorb loss may be less politically sustainable in protracted, high-attrition campaigns—particularly if adversaries can impose early, visible losses. This arguably reinforces PLA emphasis on short, decisive, technology-intensive operations and coercive strategies that seek to deter without, rather than risk grinding wars of attrition.

Faced with such daunting prospects, the Chinese government increased PLA salaries by 40 percent in 2020 with an even higher raise for specialised jobs. Divorce rates in China have been rising and there is even higher incidence among soldiers due to prolonged separation from families. Now, the PLA allows soldiers to live with families in military units. Being in the family environment, however, subtracts from the bond with fellow soldiers, which is very vital in combat situations. Simple activities like soldiers eating with their families instead of spending their evenings together in the unit mess reduce the emotional bond with other soldiers as well as with the military unit.

China has vastly increased physical areas of operational responsibility for the PLA which now go far beyond Taiwan. The whole South China Sea as well as the East China Sea have become contested. The huge border of Tibet with India is one of the most difficult high-altitude frontiers that has to be constantly safeguarded by the Chinese military. Chinese borders with all of its neighbours are disputed and have to be manned. Its involvement in conflicts like that in Myanmar creates additional responsibilities for its military. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) requires substantial military presence for protecting the projects as well as the large number of Chinese employed there. China’s efforts at worldwide hegemony means that far-flung military facilities like the base in Djibouti and the Chinese presence in various countries of South America and Africa have to be sustained by the PLA. Finally, its restive regions like Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia put additional strain on the PLA.

For all its appearance of being a daunting behemoth, the PLA is suffering the deleterious effects of the demographic strain created by the one-child policy and it has no easy solution. / DAILY WORLD /

( R N prasher is a former IAS officer. The views expressed are his personal.)