China’s proposal to establish a BRICS open-source artificial-intelligence community deserves attention not merely as another diplomatic announcement, but as a possible attempt to reshape the technological balance of the emerging world. Announced by President Xi Jinping at the BRICS Summit in New Delhi, the initiative combines an attractive developmental promise with unmistakable strategic ambition. It could widen access to AI for the Global South, yet it could also extend Chinese influence over the digital infrastructure, standards and models on which developing economies increasingly depend. For India, therefore, the proposal is neither an opportunity to be embraced uncritically nor a threat to be rejected instinctively. It is a test of whether technological cooperation can be built without compromising sovereignty, and whether limited cooperation can help repair a difficult bilateral relationship.

What, precisely, has China proposed? Beijing has offered to take the lead in creating a “BRICS AI open-source community”. The proposed framework would support cooperation among member countries in developing and deploying large language models, organising specialised seminars and training programmes, exchanging technological knowledge and building a wider open AI ecosystem. China has separately proposed a BRICS digital-ecosystem cloud platform, expanded cooperation in digital skills and closer coordination in intelligent manufacturing and technological innovation. These ideas seek to move BRICS beyond political declarations towards shared technological infrastructure and practical projects. Yet the proposal remains just that, a proposal. It has not been adopted as a fully operational BRICS programme. The New Delhi Declaration does not formally establish either the open-source community or the cloud platform. Instead, it expresses broader support for accessible, safe, secure, inclusive and reliable AI, and commits members to continuing technical engagement on global AI governance. This distinction matters. Questions of governance, funding, data location, cybersecurity, intellectual property, technical standards and decision-making remain unresolved. Until BRICS members agree on these issues, the initiative should be viewed as an invitation to negotiate rather than an accomplished institution.

China’s motivation is partly developmental. Training advanced AI models requires immense computing power, specialised talent, extensive datasets and expensive cloud infrastructure. Most developing countries cannot independently afford these resources. A shared platform could give their universities, start-ups and public institutions access to models and computing facilities adapted to local languages and needs. It could support affordable applications in healthcare, education, agriculture, climate resilience and disaster management. In that sense, the initiative responds to a genuine “AI divide” that threatens to reproduce older patterns of global inequality in a new technological form.

China also wants to reduce the Global South’s reliance on proprietary systems controlled largely by American companies. By offering models, training and infrastructure through BRICS, Beijing can present itself as a champion of technological democratisation and an alternative centre of AI innovation. This message resonates among countries worried that advanced chips, foundation models, cloud services and data resources are concentrated in a handful of Western corporations. China’s wider outreach, including AI training programmes and proposed cooperation centres with BRICS and other developing-country groupings, shows that the initiative forms part of a sustained global strategy. But democratisation and influence can advance together. If China supplies the principal models, cloud services, finance and standards, participating countries may exchange dependence on Western corporations for dependence on Chinese platforms. “Open source” itself does not automatically guarantee openness. A company may release model weights while withholding training data, safety evaluations or meaningful rights of modification. A credible BRICS framework must therefore define what openness means and requires transparency concerning datasets, bias, accuracy, energy use, intellectual-property compliance and security vulnerabilities.

For India, the stakes are particularly high. India possesses an enormous pool of engineers, a dynamic start-up sector, expanding AI research and globally recognised digital public infrastructure. Through the India AI Mission, New Delhi is also investing public resources in domestic computing capacity and Indian foundation models. A well-designed BRICS arrangement could complement these efforts by giving Indian researchers and companies access to wider research networks, shared computing resources and new markets. It could also strengthen India’s claim to leadership in framing an inclusive AI agenda for the Global South.

At the same time, India cannot detach technology from national security. Its unresolved boundary dispute, military tensions and broader strategic competition with China inevitably shape perceptions of any China-led digital initiative. Shared cloud infrastructure raises questions about where Indian data would be stored, who could access it, and which country’s law would apply. Common models could create risks of malicious code, espionage, algorithmic influence and supply-chain vulnerabilities. Dependence on externally controlled infrastructure could become especially dangerous if AI is integrated into public administration, communications, energy systems or other critical services.

India should therefore engage, but as a rule-maker rather than a passive recipient. It should propose a BRICS AI Charter founded on sovereign equality, reciprocity, transparency, human oversight, cybersecurity, non-discrimination, intellectual-property protection and peaceful use. The institutional structure should provide equal representation, consensus-based decisions, rotating leadership, transparent procurement, and independent technical and security audits. Participation must remain voluntary, and every country must retain control over its sensitive data. Interoperability should prevent any single supplier from locking members into its technological ecosystem. Cooperation should begin with modest, civilian and verifiable pilot projects in climate forecasting, disaster warnings, agriculture, disease surveillance and multilingual education. India and China could jointly develop an open disaster-preparedness model without sharing personal, defence or strategic data. Governments, universities, companies and independent experts should participate, with results and safety assessments publicly reviewed.

Can such cooperation rebuild India–China trust? Technology alone cannot resolve the border question, eliminate strategic rivalry or erase years of suspicion. Indeed, a badly governed initiative could deepen distrust. But trust between major powers is rarely restored through declarations alone; it grows through repeated, limited and verifiable acts of cooperation. AI could become a confidence-building field if both countries accept clear rules, reciprocal obligations and independent scrutiny. The wisest Indian response is therefore one of constructive caution. New Delhi should neither allow geopolitical anxiety to close the door on beneficial cooperation nor permit the language of openness to obscure strategic dependence. It should help transform China’s proposal from a national initiative into a genuinely multilateral BRICS institution. If India and China can cooperate where their interests converge, protect sovereignty where risks remain, and allow small successes to build confidence gradually, AI may become more than an engine of economic change. It may also provide a carefully controlled laboratory for a more stable Asian relationship. 

( DAILY WORLD )