Today, October 16, 2026, the Omar Abdullah government has completed two years in office. It is a feat in itself that this has happened, given the intense political and administrative pressures this government faced during this tumultuous period. This survival, however, has not brought the administration the status it deserved after the 2024 elections, which mandated it to power. It is still navigating severe challenges thrust upon it, in search of its rightful place in a sensitive territory like Jammu and Kashmir. The core question is whether it will continue to swim against the tide or manage to break free from it anytime soon.

The Omar government also had to contend with and handle the fallout of crises that did not fall under its direct jurisdiction. Today, it finds itself caught in a double bind: it is expected to rise to the benchmarks of the BJP-ruled Centre while simultaneously answering to the people who gave it a vast mandate. While it is an undeniable fact that J&K is an unpredictable territory, no local government here can function and deliver without the political and financial handholding of the Centre. This reality is written into the script of its strategically located geography, facing a hostile neighboring country—Pakistan.

The internal situation, too, is not without volatility. A fair assessment shows that his government handled these crises and their severe fallouts in a superb manner, successfully fending off hostile international narratives post the Pahalgam massacre of April 2025 .These facts cannot be ignored when evaluating these two years. Pahalgam was a major incident that forced the people’s government to manage a highly explosive situation, even though the primary responsibility lay with the Lieutenant Governor, who under the Reorganization Act is entrusted with maintaining law and order.

At the same time, the elected government’s performance is being judged against the promises made in the National Conference manifesto ahead of the 2024 Assembly polls. Those elections were held on the directions of the Supreme Court after extensive pleading by Kashmir-centric parties and citizens who felt helpless in the absence of a representative government. The manifesto opened with high-profile, exaggerated promises, such as the restoration of the pre-1953 autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir—a time when the state held absolute control over all matters except defense, communications, and foreign affairs, in line with the spirit of a resolution passed in the state legislature in mid-2000.

These were misplaced promises. The Centre had already abrogated Article 370 in August 2019 and done away with the status of the state itself, an unprecedented move. At that time, talking about the restoration of greater autonomy—as is the case even today—was utopian. The manifesto also played on the hopes of unemployed youth, promising jobs, 200 free units of electricity, 12 free gas cylinders, and various other perks.

However, it also highlighted the restoration of statehood to J&K. This sounded realistic because the Government of India had made a solemn promise to restore statehood, though it inserted the condition that this would happen only at an “appropriate time.” That phrase was understood to mean a decisive victory over terrorism, which since 1990 has left thousands dead, many more maimed for life, and half a million people displaced from their homes—the majority of them Kashmiri Pandits.

By the time the elections were held, the BJP government at the Centre, working through LG Manoj Sinha, had brought about a sea change in the situation in Kashmir—the traditional battlefield between terrorism and counter-terrorism forces. A place that once had a habit of thrusting itself into international headlines for shootouts, bomb explosions, and recurring large-scale massacres began experiencing a normal life.

In Kashmir, “normal life” does not mean what it does elsewhere in the country; it meant enforcing a framework where the government machinery could function alongside the people’s aspirations. It has been said time and again, and needs to be reaffirmed, that the abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019 and the subsequent escalation of anti-terrorism operations brought life back to the common people. They could finally step out of their homes without the daily fear of being caught in crossfire, targeted by militants, or disrupted by stone-throwers targeting them and their school-going children.

The previous complex situation had arisen due to multiple factors: Pakistan, which has always nurtured ambitions to grab Kashmir for its natural resources—particularly its glaciers and water—launched an all-out offensive known as a proxy war (which was, in fact, an open war). This was compounded by internal discontent driven by the neglect of the masses, the pilferage of central funds, and a ruling elite that prioritized patronizing their favorites over helping the common people. The Centre reversed all of this.

When Omar Abdullah was sworn in on October 16, 2024, he did not have to worry about street violence or the scale of terrorism he had witnessed during his first term as Chief Minister of the state of Jammu and Kashmir between January 2009 and January 2015. The post-Article 370 period had stabilized the ground situation, and all Omar Abdullah had to do was govern and deliver on his promises.

This should have been an ideal situation for him to govern and deliver. What he failed to foresee, however, was that while the Centre was liberal with developmental funds and had covered significant ground, it remained deeply reluctant to restore statehood. His problems multiplied when the rules of the Reorganization Act were amended to tilt heavily in favor of the LG administration. This arrangement not only gave the LG control over All India Service officers but also stretched their authority over the Jammu and Kashmir Administrative Service. In J&K today, just as in the past, the real power center belongs solely to the authority that can transfer officers and maintains a complete hold over the law-and-order machinery. Nothing else matters.

Finding himself and his government cornered on all fronts—including aggressive attacks by the Opposition—Chief Minister Omar Abdullah ramped up his campaign for the restoration of statehood. He continuously reminded Delhi of its promises and questioned the definition of an “appropriate time.”

This strategy served two purposes for him: it signaled to both Delhi and the Opposition that they could not demand answers on his manifesto promises while his government was being deliberately kept powerless. Simultaneously, it explained to the public why they were not receiving what they were promised. It was both a reflection of reality and a sharp political stratagem.

What Omar cannot explain with conviction, however, is why he has failed to live up to public expectations in areas where statehood is not required. Issues like the continued imprisonment of Kashmiri youth, the security protocols reminiscent of the post-Pulwama attack phenomenon that halt highway traffic (especially in the Valley), and his failure to speak out in a timely manner have left his government on the back foot.

His thesis that everything will be resolved or delivered by the time he completes his full five-year term in 2029 is making the public impatient. In reality, the elected government remains in search of the space to govern. Some of these constraints were inherent to the Union Territory system, which is dragging on against his wishes and the promises he held out to the people of J&K. Yet, this still does not fully excuse the government’s retreat in areas where it desperately needs to race against time to meet the expectationsof the masses. 

( DAILY WORLD )