Iran conflict and the Abraham accords: Peace initiative or strategic realignment
Nehaluddin Ahmad
- Posted: June 03, 2026
- Updated: 02:15 PM
The renewed Iran conflict and the aggressive expansion of the Abraham Accords by former U.S. President Donald Trump have once again placed the Middle East at the centre of global geopolitics. Trump’s recent statement that countries such as Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar should “mandatorily” join the Abraham Accords has intensified debates across the Muslim world. The issue is no longer confined to diplomatic normalization with Israel; it has become deeply connected with questions of regional security, the future of Palestine, domestic legitimacy, and the emerging global order. To understand the present controversy, one must revisit the historical evolution of Arab Israeli diplomacy. Since the establishment of the Israeli Declaration of Independence in May 1948, the Arab world largely refused to recognize Israel, insisting that the Palestinian question must first be resolved. This position shaped decades of conflict, including the Arab Israeli wars of 1948, 1967, and 1973. Arab nationalism, Palestinian solidarity, and opposition to Israel became central pillars of regional political identity.
The first major shift came through the Camp David Accords of 1978–79. Under the mediation of U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed a historic peace agreement. Egypt became the first Arab country to formally recognize Israel, while Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. Although the treaty ended the state of war between the two countries, it also triggered enormous anger within the Arab world. Camp David demonstrated that Arab states could pursue national strategic interests independently of broader Arab consensus. The second major diplomatic breakthrough emerged through the Oslo Accords in 1993. The agreements between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, facilitated during the presidency of Bill Clinton, created the Palestinian Authority and generated hopes for a future Palestinian state under the “two-state solution” framework. The iconic handshake between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat on the White House lawn symbolized a rare moment of optimism. In 1994, Jordan also signed a formal peace treaty with Israel, becoming the second Arab state to normalize relations.
However, the Oslo process eventually collapsed. Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank continued, mutual distrust deepened, and the Second Intifada shattered hopes for lasting peace. The failure of Oslo created widespread scepticism across the Arab world regarding peace negotiations centred on Palestinian statehood. Against this background emerged the Abraham Accords in 2020. Brokered by the Trump administration, the agreements normalized relations between Israel and several Arab states, beginning with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, followed later by Morocco and Sudan. Unlike Camp David or Oslo, the Abraham Accords represented a fundamental strategic shift. The earlier Arab position had insisted that normalization with Israel would follow the resolution of the Palestinian issue. The Abraham Accords effectively reversed that logic: normalization first, Palestine later.
This transformation reflected changing geopolitical realities. The principal factor behind the Accords was the growing perception of Iran as a regional threat. Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran has projected itself as a resistance power opposing American and Israeli influence. Through alliances with groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and the Houthis, Iran expanded its regional influence across the Middle East. The United States, Israel, and several Gulf states increasingly viewed Iran, not Palestine, as the primary security challenge.
Consequently, the Abraham Accords became more than peace agreements; they evolved into a broader regional security architecture. Intelligence sharing, missile defense cooperation, cyber security, drone technology, trade, investment, and energy coordination all became central components of the new alignment. Israel’s advanced technological capabilities also appealed to Gulf states seeking to diversify their oil-dependent economies. At the same time, the Accords reflected America’s desire to maintain influence in a region where China and Russia are rapidly expanding their presence. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, energy investments, and infrastructure projects have strengthened Beijing’s role across the Gulf. Washington views the Abraham Accords as part of a broader pro-American strategic order designed to preserve U.S. influence in a transforming Middle East.
Trump’s recent effort to compel additional Muslim-majority states to join the Accords must therefore be understood within this wider geopolitical framework. It is not merely about Arab Israeli peace. Rather, it seeks to consolidate a regional bloc capable of balancing Iran and limiting Chinese and Russian influence. In this sense, the Accords are simultaneously diplomatic, economic, military, and geopolitical instruments. Yet the Gaza war has profoundly complicated this strategy. The devastating humanitarian crisis in Gaza has generated intense anger throughout the Muslim world. Public opinion across the Middle East, South Asia, and beyond remains deeply sympathetic toward the Palestinians. Images of civilian casualties, destruction, and displacement have transformed Palestine once again into a powerful emotional and moral issue.
This creates a major contradiction. Governments increasingly pursue pragmatic, interest-based diplomacy focused on security, technology, investment, and strategic alliances. However, public opinion continues to view Palestine through the lens of justice, identity, religion, and historical grievance. The gap between governments and societies is widening. This tension is particularly visible in Pakistan and Turkey. Pakistan has historically maintained that it will not recognize Israel until an independent Palestinian state is established. Public sentiment in Pakistan strongly supports Palestine, and any attempt to join the Abraham Accords could provoke severe domestic backlash from religious parties, civil society, and opposition groups. For Pakistan, the issue is not simply diplomatic but ideological and emotional.
Turkey presents a more complex case. Although Turkey maintains diplomatic and trade relations with Israel, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has consistently projected himself as a vocal defender of Palestinian rights. Turkish public opinion remains highly sensitive to Gaza, making open participation in a pro-Israel regional bloc politically risky. The most consequential state, however, remains Saudi Arabia. As custodian of Islam’s holiest sites in Mecca and Medina, Saudi Arabia carries enormous symbolic weight in the Muslim world. If Riyadh formally joins the Abraham Accords, the regional balance could shift dramatically. Yet Saudi leaders continue to insist that meaningful progress toward Palestinian statehood remains essential before normalization can proceed. The Abraham Accords reflect a new Middle Eastern order shaped by strategic realism, security interests, and geopolitical competition rather than ideological unity. Yet the unresolved Palestinian issue continues to challenge their legitimacy. As long as Gaza suffers and a credible Palestinian solution remains absent, normalization with Israel will remain controversial across much of the Muslim world. / DAILY WORLD /
( Prof Nehaluddin Ahmad, LL.D. Professor of Law, Sultan Sharif Ali Islamic University (UNISSA), Brunei, Email: ahmadnehal@yahoo.com )